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Abstract
When the transmission channel between savers and borrowing firms is disturbed,
firms may find themselves borrowing-constrained. I study the optimal fiscal pol-
icy response to a tightening borrowing constraint in a simple two-period model.
I find that it is not optimal to subsidize firms, although this would relax the
constraint and help firms directly. Instead, the optimal response exploits the dis-
tortion caused by the borrowing constraint and reduces existing tax distortions.
This result is robust to when endogenous government spending and investment
are part of the government’s set of instruments.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I consider a scenario in which producing firms want to borrow more funds in
order to increase production and households are willing to lend additional funds. Yet, they
cannot: the transmission channel between savers and borrowers is disturbed. For example,
such a situation may be the result of a credit crunch during a financial recession where
banks are uncertain about the future and stop lending. Usually, it does not take much time
until the public calls for government subsidies or asks the government to step in and pick
up the drop in demand in the form of higher government consumption or investment. In
such a scenario, is it the optimal fiscal policy response to relax the borrowing constraint by
giving firms a subsidy? I set up a simple two-period model and investigate the optimal pol-
icy response. First, I answer this question for a given amount of government expenditures.
Second, I let government consumption and investment be endogenous and be part of the
optimal policy response.
The model lasts for two periods and features a representative household that can save
in government bonds and can lend to a representative firm. The firm, facing a borrowing
constraint, borrows from the household in the first period to build capital which produces
the output good in the second period. The exogenous borrowing constraint is ad hoc and
represents a disruption in the financing channel from private savers (households) to borrowers
(firms). In addition to issuing public debt, the government levies distortionary labor taxes
and savings income taxes on the household. This tax revenue enables the government
to finance exogenously fixed government spending and a subsidy transfer to the firm. The
possibility of the subsidy allows the government to address the borrowing constraint directly
by relaxing the firm’s borrowing constraint. Modeled as a lump-sum transfer, the transfer
takes the simplest form and imposes no additional distortions.
In a later extension, I allow for endogenous government consumption and investment.
Government consumption enters the household’s utility function and public investment raises
the productivity of private capital. This extension allows addressing whether the government
should step in by increasing public spending.1 Then, the optimal policy of the government
does not only consist of setting tax rates in order to finance a given path of government
consumption but also of choosing and adjusting the path of government spending.
I study the impact of a tightening borrowing constraint on the Ramsey policy and al-
location. I find that if the government does not change its policy, private capital and thus
production and consumption are depressed in the second period, as firms are forced to bor-
row less and build less capital. The household saves less and thus shifts her consumption
profile by consuming relatively more in the first period. In equilibrium, the interest rate
falls.2 At the same time, the marginal product of capital increases and a wedge between the
1For example, it is often thought that productive government investment would not only have short-lived
demand effects but also long-term benefits via an improvement in the public capital stock. Aschauer (1989)
finds that public capital has a significant impact on the productivity of private capital. The International
Monetary Fund (2014) suggests that in times of low growth, infrastructure projects would pay for itself in
countries with low borrowing rates and public investment needs.
2The described scenario could also reflect a savings glut that has been discussed extensively recently.
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cost of borrowing and the return to capital appears. This wedge reflects the disruption of
the transmission channel: Borrowers and lenders would like to borrow and lend at a slightly
higher rate, but cannot because of the borrowing constraint. Without the restriction of
the borrowing constraint, firms could increase their profits and households would receive a
higher return on their savings.
How should the government respond to a tightening of the borrowing constraint? It
seems plausible that the optimal policy involves addressing the distortion caused by the
tighter borrowing constraint: By paying a subsidy to the firm, the government could relax
or even undo the borrowing constraint such that it is slack. However, I find that increasing
subsidies is not optimal. Rather, it is optimal to decrease distortionary labor taxes and
increase the tax on the household’s return to savings.
The reasoning is as follows. The Ramsey planner can exploit the distortion of the bor-
rowing constraint and the resulting wedge. The Ramsey policy implements a higher savings
income tax rate which leads to an increase in the borrowing rate for capital and closes the
wedge. Importantly, the increase in the savings tax has no distortionary effect. Using this
new revenue, the government could pay out a subsidy to relax the borrowing constraint.
However, I show that it is optimal to decrease distortionary labor taxes instead. Only when
the borrowing constraint is relatively tight and private capital is sufficiently suppressed it is
optimal to pay out a subsidy and address the distortion caused by the borrowing constraint.
However, it is never optimal to fully relax the borrowing constraint.
This example provides a more general insight. If a new distortion, here in form of the
borrowing constraint, affects the economy, the existence of other distortions matters for
the optimal policy response. The government could loosen the borrowing constraint, but
the government would have to levy additional distortionary taxes which would worsen the
existing tax distortion.
In the extension where government consumption and investment is endogenous, the same
mechanism takes place. Until the borrowing constraint is not sufficiently tight, it is not op-
timal to pay out a subsidy. Instead, the Ramsey policy again involves lower labor taxes and
higher savings taxes. The optimal policy also leads to higher government consumption and
government investment in the first period.
There are a few other papers that investigate borrowing constraints and optimal policy.
Azzimonti and Yared (2017) show in a model with heterogeneous agents and lump-sum
taxes that it is optimal to keep some households borrowing-constrained. This enables the
government to decrease consumption inequality between agents. Similarly, in Bhandari,
Evans, Golosov, and Sargent (2017), welfare can be higher in an equilibrium with borrowing-
constrained households. Then the government is the sole supplier of lending and can extract
monopoly rent by issuing debt at a lower interest rate. In Yared (2013), building on the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework, agents can invest in short- and long-term assets
and are subject to liquidity shocks. Private debt is not enforceable, contrary to public debt
which the government can pay back by enforcing lump-sum taxes.3 Accordingly, government
Real interest rates are historically low even though the return has not diminished much, see e.g. Gomme,
Ravikumar, and Rupert (2015). One primary policy advice is usually that the government should take
advantage of low interest rates to borrow and invest.
3There is a rich literature where public debt provides liquidity and relaxes private borrowing constraints,
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debt can undo borrowing limits of the agents who are hit by liquidity shocks. However,
fully relaxing the borrowing limit would lead to a sub-optimal investment in the short-term
asset. In these three papers, households trade with each other because they have different
exogenously given productivities or are hit by liquidity shocks (in Yared, 2013). Government
policy then determines if and how individual households are borrowing-constrained. In
contrast, I study how the extent of an exogenously given borrowing constraint affects optimal
fiscal policy when taxes are distortionary and households are alike.
Biljanovska (2017) investigates optimal policy in a collateral-constrained economy. The
inefficiencies caused by the collateral constraint can be undone by corrective (distortionary)
and lump-sum taxes that can deliver the first-best allocation. The government does not levy
taxes to finance an exogenously given amount of spending, but only to affect the collateral
constraint and to redistribute. In response to a tightening of the collateral constraint, it is
optimal to decrease capital income and payroll taxes to stimulate production. The fact that
distortionary taxes are only present to undo the distortion of the collateral constraint is the
main difference compared to my set up, where the borrowing constraint helps to mitigate
existing tax distortions. Finally, in contrast to the mentioned papers, I study an extension
where government spending and investment is endogenous.
In terms of methodology, this paper connects to the literature of optimal taxation (the
Ramsey plan) where a government needs to finance expenditures with distortionary taxes
(e.g. Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1994). The extension in
Section 5 also connects to the literature on fiscal policy where government spending and
investment is endogenous. Government expenditures increase the productivity of private
capital and can, therefore, drive growth (see, e.g., Barro, 1990; Turnovsky, 1997).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and defines the com-
petitive equilibrium. Section 3 sets up the Ramsey planner’s problem and characterizes
optimal policy. In Section 4, I discuss the effect of a tightening borrowing constraint on the
Ramsey policy. Section 5 presents the extension with endogenous government expenditures.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and equilibrium
2.1 Model overview
Time is discrete and the economy lasts two periods, t = 0, 1. There are three agents: a
representative household, a representative firm and a government.
A. Household sector
The representative household has preferences over consumption ct and leisure xt:
u(c0, x0) + βu(c1, x1).
e.g. Woodford (1990), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998).
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Her budget constraints are given by
t = 0 : c0 + b1 + a1 = (1− τw0 )(1− x0)w0, (1)
t = 1 : c1 = (1− τw1 )(1− x1)w1 + (1− τ b1)Rb1b1 + (1− τa1 )Ra1a1 + π1. (2)
The household is endowed with one unit of time and therefore supplies labor 1 − xt. In
period 0, the wage (or productivity) is exogenous and given by w0.4 In the second period,
w1 is determined endogenously. The labor tax rate at time t is τwt . The household can buy
government bonds b1 that yield a gross return Rb1 and lend a1 to private firms at a gross
return Ra1 . The tax rates on her savings income are given by τ b1 and τa1 , respectively. Finally,
the household receives the firm profits π1 in the form of a lump-sum transfer.5
The household’s optimality conditions are
uc(0) = βuc(1)R
b
1(1− τ b1), (3)
uc(0) = βuc(1)R
a
1(1− τa1 ), (4)
ux(0)/uc(0) = (1− τw0 )w0, (5)
ux(1)/uc(1) = (1− τw1 )w1. (6)
The two Euler equations (3) and (4) give rise to a no-arbitrage condition between the net
returns of lending to the firm and the government, respectively: (1 − τ b1)Rb1 = (1 − τa1 )Ra1 .
Equations (5) and (6) are the standard labor supply equations that reflect the intratemporal
tradeoff between consumption and leisure.
B. Firm sector
The representative firm has an initial endowment ω0. In period t = 0, it can borrow
a1 from households to form private capital k1. In addition the firm may receive a subsidy
s0 ≥ 0 from the government:
k1 = ω0 + a1 + s0. (7)
In period t = 1 the firm maximizes profits π1 with a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses k1
and labor L1 as inputs:
f(k1, L1) = Ak
α
1L
ζ
1.
The parameters α and ζ are the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively.6 The
firm hires labor L1 at wage w1 and pays back the loan a1 with interest Ra1 . Its profits are
π1 = f(k1, L1)−Ra1a1 − w1L1 + (1− δ)k1, (8)
4I abstract from firm production in period 0 in order to keep the problem as simple as possible. I assume
that labor productivity is predetermined by actions in a previous period and is hence fixed in t = 0 when
the borrowing constraint tightens. This simplification ensures a partial closed-form solution.
5There is no lump-sum tax on the household. Doing so would make the problem trivial. Following a
tightening borrowing constraint, the government could increase the household lump-sum tax and finance a
higher subsidy payment, leaving the allocation the same. The household would save less, however, she would
receive more profit payments under the optimal policy. See Appendix C.1 for more details.
6Whether the production function features increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale plays no
role.
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where δ is the depreciation rate on capital. Maximizing profits, the firm chooses borrowing
a1, capital k1 and labor L1. Importantly, the borrowing choice of the firm a1 may be limited
by a borrowing constraint a1 ≤ ā. Replacing a1 = k1 − ω0 − s0 the problem of the firm is
max
k1,L1
f(k1, L1)−Ra1(k1 − ω0 − s0)− w1L1 + (1− δ)k1
s.t. k1 − ω0 − s0 ≤ ā.
First order conditions are
fL(k1, L1) = w1, (9)
fk(k1, L1) + 1− δ = Ra1 + θ
f
0 , (10)
where θf0 ≥ 0 is the multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint of the firm. The
accompanying complementary slackness condition is
θf0 [k1 − ω0 + s0 − ā] = 0, θ
f
0 ≥ 0. (11)
Equations (9) and (10) reflect the firm’s demand for labor and capital, respectively. While
the former is standard, the latter reflects the role of the borrowing constraint. When the
constraint is slack, we have θf0 = 0 and fk + 1 − δ = Ra1 : The marginal product of capital
equals the cost of borrowing. When the constraint is binding, we have k1 = ω0 + s0 + ā and
θf0 > 0. Then, the constraint is costly and R
a
1 < fk + 1− δ: The firm would like to borrow
more as this would increase its profits. There is a wedge between the firm’s borrowing cost
and the marginal product of capital.
Remark (borrowing constraint). The ad hoc borrowing constraint can be inter-
preted in various ways. For example, the borrowing constraint could be a result of limited
enforcement by the government as in Bhandari et al. (2017). The government imposes an
arbitrarily high punishment on agents if they default on any debt less than ā, but does not
enforce any contracts where debt exceeds ā. Alternatively, the borrowing constraint could
be a result of limited commitment as in Itskhoki and Moll (2014). Here, the firm can default
and keep a fraction 0 < 1ρ < 1 of borrowing a1 but would lose its endowment. This would
lead to a borrowing constraint of a1 ≤ ρω0 and ρ then determines the maximum leverage
ratio.
C. Government sector
The government issues debt b1, levies labor income at tax rates τwt , savings incomes at
tax rates τa1 and τ b1 , pays a transfer s0 to firms and purchases government consumption
g0, g1. It has an endowment ω
g
0 . Its budget constraints are
t = 0 : g0 + s0 = τ
w
0 (1− x0)w0 + b1 + ω
g
0 ,
t = 1 : g1 +R
b
1b1 = τ
w
1 (1− x1)w1 + τa1Ra1a1 + τ b1Rb1b1.
The government follows a feasible policy µ = {τw0 , τw1 , τa1 , τ b1 , b1, g0, g1, s0} that satisfies
its budget constraints. Note that conditional on prices and allocation, not all elements of µ
can be set independently of each other in order to fulfill all equilibrium conditions.
Remark (other taxes). The savings income tax and the labor tax allow the Ramsey
planner to affect the intertemporal and the intratemporal margin, respectively. Neither a
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consumption tax in period 1 nor a profit tax changes the result qualitatively (a consumption
tax in period 0 is redundant for the Ramsey policy). Whether the savings income tax is
paid by the household or the firm makes no difference. See Appendix C.1 for more details.
D. Market Clearing
In equilibrium, labor market clearing implies
L1 = 1− x1. (12)
Combining the various dynamic budget constraints yields the following resource constraints:
c0 + g0 + k1 = (1− x0)w0 + ω0 + ωg0 , (13)
c1 + g1 = f(k1, 1− x1) + (1− δ)k1. (14)
In the first period, firm and government endowments and labor income are used for private
and government consumption, and investment. In the second period, production and left-
over capital equal household and public consumption.
2.2 Equilibrium
Equations (1)-(14) characterize the general equilibrium. The government budget constraints
are implied by the resource constraints, and the household and firm budget constraints by
Walras’ Law. This gives a system of 20 variables and 14 equations and leaves 6 free variables
for the government to choose. For example, with µ = {g1, s0, τ b1 , τa1 , τw0 , τw1 }, the remaining
policy instruments g0 and b1 are determined endogenously.
Definition. A competitive equilibrium conditional on a government policy µ is a set
of quantities {c0, c1, x0, x1, L1, k1, a1, b1, π1}, and a vector of prices P = (Ra1 , Rb1, w1) such
that:
1. Given prices and government policy µ the household chooses {b1, a1, c0, c1, x0, x1} op-
timally to solve her maximization problem.
2. Given prices and government policy µ the firm chooses {L1, a1} optimally to solve its
maximization problem subject to the borrowing constraint.
3. The markets for goods and labor clear, i.e. equations (12)-(14) hold and P is the
market clearing vector of prices for assets and labor.
Without loss of generality, I set τ b1 = 0 and thus Rb1 = Ra1(1 − τa1 ) (implied by the no-
arbitrage condition from the household’s problem). In equilibrium, a change in τ b1 requires
a one-to-one change in Rb1 since household only cares about the return net of taxes. At the
same time, in t = 1 the government’s debt payment net its tax revenue on that debt is also
determined by Rb1(1− τ b1).
3 The Ramsey problem
In this section, I first present the problem of the Ramsey planner and derive the conditions
for a first-best allocation. For an arbitrary government policy, there may be a wedge be-
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tween the interest rate Ra1 the firm pays, and the marginal product of capital fk + 1− δ (see
equation (10)) of the borrowing-constrained firm. I show that under the optimal Ramsey
policy, there is no such wedge.
The implementability constraints. The Ramsey planner maximizes the household’s
welfare. He chooses an allocation and associated policy while respecting all competitive equi-
librium conditions. These conditions can be summarized by the following implementability
constraints (see Appendix A.1 for a derivation):
uc(0)c0 + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1) + . . .
+ βuc(1) [(1− ζ)f(k1, 1− x1) + (1− δ)k1 −
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )
(k1 − ω0 − s0)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=π1
, (15)
c0 + g0 + k1 = (1− x0)w0 + ω0 + ωg0 , (16)
c1 + g1 = f(k1, 1− x1) + (1− δ)k1, (17)
k1 − ω0 − s0 ≤ ā, (18)
uc(0) ≤ βuc(1)(fk + 1− δ)(1− τa1 ), (19)
0 ≤ s0. (20)
Equation (15) is the household intertemporal budget constraint where the net interest rates
and net wages have been replaced by the household’s optimality condition for consumption
and labor. The term in the square brackets is the firm’s profits, where the wage and interest
rate have been replaced with the firm’s optimality condition for labor and the household’s
marginal rate of substitution, respectively. Equations (16) and (17) are the resource con-
straints of the economy. The borrowing constraint is given by (18), where private borrowing
a1 has been replaced by the firm budget constraint. Equation (19) is the firm’s optimal-
ity condition for capital k1, where the interest rate has been replaced by the household’s
marginal rate of substitution. This inequality reflects the possible wedge: the interest rate
may be smaller than the marginal product of capital in case the firm is borrowing con-
strained. Finally, the subsidy constraint (20) ensures that subsidies are positive.
The optimal Ramsey allocation and policy is the one that maximizes
u(c0, x0) + βu(c1, x1)
subject to the implementability constraints (15)-(20). The following proposition discusses
the conditions for the first-best allocation. A direct corollary to this proof will show that
under the Ramsey policy there is no wedge, i.e. equation (19) holds with equality.
Proposition 1. The first-best allocation results if and only if neither the borrowing nor
the subsidy constraint is binding.
Proof. Forming the Lagrangian, the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for s0 and τa1
are
s0 : λuc(0)/(1− τa1 ) = θ0 + θ2, (21)
τa1 : λ
uc(0)
(1− τa1 )2
(k1 − ω0 − s0) = θ1βuc(1)(fk + 1− δ), (22)
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where λ is the multiplier associated with (15) and θ0, θ1, θ2 are the multipliers associated
with (18)-(20). By definition, the shadow values θ0, θ1, θ2 of the inequality constraints are
nonnegative. If neither constraint (18) nor (20) is binding, then θ0 = θ2 = 0 which implies
λ = 0 by (21). Equation (22) then implies θ1 = 0. The set of relevant implementability
constraints then collapses to the two resources constraints and the first-best allocation of
the social planner results. On the contrary, when one of the two constraints is binding, then
λ 6= 0 and the Ramsey planner has to resort to distortionary taxation and the first-best
social planner allocation is not attainable. 
The first-best allocation results, if, for example, ωg0 is large enough and the government
can finance its expenditures with its initial endowment. Alternatively, the first-best can be
attained when there is no lower bound on subsidy payments, such that the planner finances
the government’s expenditures through a lump-sum tax on firm borrowing.7 As I will show,
the interesting case is where the borrowing constraint binds in the presence of distortionary
taxes.
Corollary 1. When the economy is not in the first-best allocation, equation (19) holds
with equality.
Proof. This corollary follows directly from equations (21) and (22). A binding subsidy or
borrowing constraint implies that λ 6= 0 and therefore θ1 6= 0. The inequality constraint (19)
holds with equality. 
The implication of Corollary 1 is that under the Ramsey policy, there is no wedge between
the marginal product of capital and the cost of capital for the firm: fk + 1− δ = Ra1 . From
the Ramsey planner’s point of view, when the inequality constraint Ra1 ≤ fk + 1− δ is just
binding, his choice set is no more constrained than when it holds with a strict inequality.
Indeed, the Ramsey planner implements an allocation where Ra1 = fk + 1 − δ. I explain in
more detail in 4.3, why this is optimal.
The result of Corollary 1 allows the substitution of the tax rate τa1 in the profit function
using equation (19).8 The maximization problem of the Ramsey planner can be rewritten
as
max u(c0, x0) + βu(c1, x1)
s.t. uc(0)c0 + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1)+
+ βuc(1) [(1− α− ζ)f(k1, 1− x1) + (fk + 1− δ)(ω0 + s0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=π1
],
(1− x0)w0 + ω0 + ωg0 = c0 + g0 + k1,
f(k1, 1− x1) + (1− δ)k1 = c1 + g1,
ā ≥ k1 − ω0 − s0,
s0 ≥ 0.
7The statement holds as long as the subsidy payments do not cause further distortions. If, for example,
the subsidy carries wasteful tax collection costs, the first-best allocation does not result.
8In the first-best allocation the inequality constraint (19) also holds with equality. The borrowing
constraint for the firm is not binding and therefore fk + 1 − δ = Ra1 = uc(0)/[βuc(1)(1 − τa1 )].
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The first order conditions of this problem together with the implementability constraints,
characterize the optimal policy and allocation. See Appendix A.2 for the full list.
4 A special case
In this section, I develop the main insight: Following a tightening of the borrowing constraint,
it is not optimal to relax the borrowing constraint, but rather to exploit this new constraint
and reduce existing tax distortions. I explore this result with a parametrization that has a
(partial) closed-form solution. The results remain robust to other parametrizations.
4.1 Specification and result
Let household preferences be
u(ct, xt) = log ct − ϕ(1− xt),
and the production function be
f(k1, L1) = Ak
α
1 ,
i.e. labor is not productive in the second period and therefore there is no labor supply
in period 1. There is full depreciation δ = 1 and the firm and the government have no
endowment, that is ω0 = ω
g
0 = 0. The government has to finance an exogenous amount
ḡ0 > 0, whereas g1 = 0. Therefore the government budget constraints simplify to
ḡ0 + s0 = τ
w
0 (1− x0)w0 + b1,
Rb1b1 = τ
a
1R
a
1a1,
where Rb1 = (1 − τa1 )Ra1 because of the no-arbitrage condition between the two assets.
Together with s0 ≥ 0, these conditions ensure that, independent of whether the borrowing
constraint is binding or not, the government needs to levy distortionary taxes to finance ḡ0
and the subsidy s0. The government can either do this by levying labor taxes today, issue
debt that is financed by savings income taxes tomorrow or a combination of both. The
capital stock is determined by k1 = a1 + s0.
Remark. The details of the parametrization are not important and are only chosen to
achieve a partial closed-form solution. Preferences are a special case of u(c, x) = c
1−σ
1−σ −
ϕ (1−x)
1+ν
1+ν where σ → 1 and ν = 0. I conduct a number of numerical simulations where I
vary parameters σ and ν. The observations of the comparative statics exercise remain the
same.
Figure 1 graphs the equilibrium allocation and policy for parameter values w0 = 2.5,
α = 2/3, ϕ = 3, A = 1, β = 0.98 and ḡ0 = 0.1. The figure shows the evolution of the
variables under the optimal policy as a function of the borrowing constraint ā. The way
to read the four panels is as follows: On every panel, moving from right to left (along the
x-axis) implies a tightening of the borrowing constraint. At the very right of each panel, the
borrowing constraint is not yet binding. At this point, as a1 < ā, a decreasing ā has no effect
on the equilibrium allocation and policy and it is optimal to finance ḡ0 with labor taxes τw0
only. Savings income taxes τa1 are set to zero, thus b1 = 0 and no subsidy is necessary as
the firm can finance itself without restriction.
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Figure 1: Comparative statics: a special case
Moving right to left, eventually (ā = 0.505), the borrowing constraint becomes binding
and the Ramsey planner adjusts the tax rates. However, it is not optimal to increase the
subsidy and relax the borrowing constraint. The subsidy s0 remains zero under the optimal
policy. Instead, it is optimal to issue debt, financed by an increase in the tax rate on savings
τa1 (see Panel 1 in Figure 1). At the same time, it is optimal to decrease the labor income
tax rate. The lower labor tax rate allows for higher consumption c0 in t = 0 and leads to
lower consumption c1 (see panel 2).
Then, moving further to the left, there is a kink (ā = 0.488): When the borrowing
constraint is sufficiently tight, it becomes optimal to pay out subsidies s0 to prop up capital
k1. At the same time, labor tax rates increase and consumption c0 falls again. The fall in
c1 less steep, as the subsidy props up capital and thus production in t = 1.
Panel 4 also shows that the wedge is closed under the optimal policy. While the interest
rate on government debt falls (black line), the cost of borrowing Ra1 increases along with
and is equal to the return to capital fk.
4.2 Characterization of the optimal policy
In what follows, I characterize optimal policy for the special case considered in Figure 1
from right to left. I distinguish three phases: To the right of the kink, where the borrowing
constraint is binding but ā is relatively high; the kink itself; and to the left of the kink.
A. To the right of the kink. Both constraints are binding.
To the right of the kink I can find a closed-form solution.9 When the borrowing constraint
is not—or only weakly—binding, the subsidy constraint is binding. Because the government
has no endowment, it has to raise taxes. It would like to tax the firm by setting s0 < 0
but cannot. It follows that the multiplier θ2 associated with s0 ≥ 0 is positive and s0 = 0.
Instead of taxing firms, the government has to levy distortionary labor taxes to finance ḡ0.
Thus, when the borrowing constraint becomes binding, we have k1 = a1 = ā since the
subsidy continues being set at s0 = 0. Combining the first order conditions leads to the
9See Appendix B.1 for the block of equations that characterize the equilibrium under the optimal policy.
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Euler equation
1
c0
= β
1
c1
fk(1− λ) + θ2 = β
1
c1
fk − θ0, (23)
where λ and θ0 are the multipliers associated with the implementability constraint derived
from the household intertemporal budget constraint and the borrowing constraint a1 ≤ ā,
respectively. It follows that in optimum, the tax rate on savings income τa1 is positive when
the borrowing constraint is binding (i.e. when θ0 > 0). When both constraints are binding,
the optimal allocation and policy is given by
1− x0 =
1 + αβ
ϕ
,
c0 = (1 + αβ)w0/ϕ− ā− ḡ0,
τw0 = 1− ϕc0/w0,
τa1 = 1− ā/(αβc0).
Finally, k1 = ā and c1 = Aāα.
These results are reflected in Figure 1. With a tighter borrowing constraint (a falling ā),
labor supply is constant and consumption c0 is increasing.10 Production and consumption
c1 are decreasing because the subsidy remains at zero. The labor tax rate falls with a more
binding borrowing constraint and reflects the lower marginal utility of consumption. The
savings income tax rate increases with a tighter borrowing constraint.11 With consumption
higher in t = 0 and lower in t = 1, the interest rate Rb1 falls strongly. Looking at the
government budget constraint,
b1 = ḡ0 − τw0 (1− x0)w0,
debt increases. With labor tax revenue falling short of ḡ0, the gap is financed with debt and
payed back with higher revenue from savings income taxes.
B. Existence of the kink.
As the borrowing constraint tightens (and we move to left in the figure), it eventually
becomes optimal to prop up k1 by increasing the subsidy s0 > 0. At the point at which the
subsidy constraint is not binding anymore, the comparative statics of the other variables
also change.
Proposition 2. When borrowing conditions are sufficiently tight, the subsidy constraint
is no longer binding.
Proof. Using the Euler equation (23) for k1, the shadow value of the subsidy constraint
is:
θ2 = 1/c0 − αβ/ā
(
2− w0/(c0ϕ)
)
with c0 = (1 + αβ)w0/ϕ− ā− ḡ0. Conditional on the parametrization, we have ∂θ2/∂ā > 0
and the shadow value is therefore strictly increasing in ā.12 As the borrowing constraint
10Labor supply decreases when the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply is positive.
11This follows directly from the fact that the inequality constraint (19) is binding and therefore c1/(βc0) =
fk(1 − τa1 ) = αc1(1 − τa1 )/ā.
121+αβ > 2ā is a sufficient condition. For a wide range of specifications and parametrizations considered
in numerical simulations, the shadow price θ2 is monotonically decreasing with a falling ā.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics, ωg0 = ḡ0
tightens and ā falls, the value of θ2 approaches zero from above. Setting θ2 = 0 gives the
value āl where the borrowing constraint is no longer binding (is slack):
āl =
αβ(w0 + 2αβw0 − 2ϕḡ0)
ϕ(1 + 2αβ)
.

C. To the left of the kink: Increase of the subsidy and reversal of other variables.
When the subsidy constraint is no longer binding it becomes optimal to set s0 > 0. A
closed-form solution is no longer obtainable. The existence of the kink crucially depends on
whether the subsidy constraint is (or is not) slack when the borrowing constraint starts to
tighten. Helping to understand why the evolution of the variables reverses, Figure 2 illus-
trates the comparative statics experiment when I start out in a first-best allocation and no
distortionary taxes are necessary. For example, this is the case when the government has an
endowment ωg0 = ḡ0 such that it does not need any labor taxes to finance ḡ0. This change
ensures that the subsidy constraint is slack. Then, without a binding subsidy constraint,
the Ramsey planner is constrained by the same set of restrictions as to when we are to the
left of the kink in Figure 1. Figure 2 depicts the impact of a tightening borrowing constraint
when the subsidy constraint is not binding. When the borrowing constraint is not binding,
again at the very right of Figure 2 tax rates τw0 and τa1 are set to zero. No (distortionary)
taxes are necessary because ḡ0 can be fully financed with ω
g
0 . When the borrowing constraint
becomes binding, the transfer s0 increases with a falling ā in order to prop up private capital
k1. To finance the transfer, the government increases labor income taxes and issues debt
that is paid back based on savings income taxes. The private capital stock k1 decreases
as the constraint becomes tighter. Contrary to before, there is no kink in the evolution of
variables. This exercise with ωg0 = ḡ0 corresponds to the comparative statics of a falling ā on
the left side of the kink in Figure 1 since the Ramsey planner faces the same set of constraints.
Proposition 3. When the borrowing constraint is binding, all real variables are lower
than in the first-best allocation. Government debt and the tax rates are higher.
Proof. See Appendix B.2. 
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Figure 3: Lagrange multipliers
Simulations for varying model specifications affirm that when the subsidy constraint is
not binding (i.e. we are to the left of the kink), the evolution of variables is monotonous as
a function of a tightening borrowing constraint.
4.3 Discussion
I now discuss the optimal policy response and why the evolution of variables changes course
as a function of a tightening borrowing constraint. The following discussion does not only
correspond to the special case of subsections 4.1–4.2 but to a broad range of parametrizations.
As shown above, whether the subsidy constraint is binding plays a key role for the behavior
of the optimal policy. As soon as the subsidy constraint is no longer binding, the graphs
change their course. I discuss this observation with the help of the Lagrange multipliers
that measure the cost of the constraints faced by the Ramsey planner. Figure 3 graphs the
values of the three Lagrangian multipliers over the same space. The Lagrange multipliers
depict a kink where the subsidy constraint is slack (θ2 = 0). Moving from right to left,
the multiplier λ of the household implementability constraint decreases and then starts to
increase again. The multiplier θ0 of the borrowing constraint shoots up and increases with
a lower slope after the kink.
Initially, the appearance of the borrowing constraint has the effect that both the shadow
cost of the household implementability constraint λ and the shadow cost of the subsidy
constraint θ2 become smaller. The interdependence between these three multipliers can be
seen directly by the first order condition for s0:
λβuc(1)fk(k1, L1) = θ0 + θ2.
Under the optimal policy, marginally increasing the subsidy s0 has a marginal benefit equal
to θ0 + θ2: Increasing the subsidy relaxes both constraints. This benefit is weighed against
the cost of having to levy distortionary taxes to finance the subsidy, which is captured by
λβuc(1)fk(k1, L1). Even though θ0 increases with a falling ā, a rapidly falling θ2 allows for
a decrease in λ as well. Once θ2 = 0 (i.e. the subsidy constraint is slack), λ and θ0 move in
the same direction.13 I now discuss the optimal policy in more detail from right to left.
13See the Appendix B.1 for closed-form solutions for the multipliers to the right side of the kink.
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The cost of the subsidy constraint θ2 decreases with a falling ā. The intuition
is straightforward. Initially, when the borrowing constraint is not yet binding, the Ramsey
planner would like to set the subsidy to a negative level to finance ḡ0. As private capital
becomes depressed, the benefit of doing so becomes smaller because it would depress private
capital even further. That is, the Ramsey planner would still like to set a negative s0, but
at a less negative level compared to when the borrowing constraint is not binding. The
marginal benefit of relaxing the subsidy constraint θ2 falls. Eventually, when the borrowing
constraint is sufficiently tight, it becomes optimal to implement a positive subsidy s0: the
subsidy constraint is slack (θ2 = 0).
Tax distortions fall initially. An increase in τa1 is not distortionary. As shown
above, to the right of the kink the fall in λ is accompanied by a fall in the labor tax rate. In
this region, the emergence of a distortion of the borrowing constraint allows for a fall in the
distortion caused by taxes. How is this possible? The Ramsey planner can increase the tax
rate on savings which has no distortionary effects. This leads to new government revenue
which allows for a reduction in distortionary labor tax rates.
A higher tax on savings is not distortionary for the following reason. For illustrative
purposes consider that the government would not adjust its policy following a tightening of
the borrowing constraint, that is it would keep the same tax rates and debt policy. Ceteris
paribus, a wedge would open up between the cost of borrowing Ra1 and the return on capital
fk + 1 − δ: Since the household can save less, consumption is shifted towards the present,
and since Ra1 reflects the consumption schedule the interest rate falls. At the same time,
the marginal product fk is higher with a lower capital stock. The Ramsey planner can now
“close” the wedge between the interest rate and the marginal product and leave the behav-
ior of the household and firm unchanged. The Ramsey planner implements an equilibrium
where both the cost of borrowing Ra1 and the tax on savings τa1 increase in a way that leaves
the net return of the household Ra1(1 − τa1 ) unchanged. This means the household is still
willing to lend ā. At the same time, following the higher interest rate Ra1 , the firm still
demands ā as long as Ra1 ≤ fk + 1 − δ. That is, as long as the wedge is open, the firm
demand for capital is completely inelastic. The behavior of both the household and firm
does not change even though the tax on savings has increased. It is in this sense that an
increase τa1 , accompanied with an increase in Ra1 does not lead to additional distortions.
Closing the wedge is optimal because it leads to distortion-free revenue. Im-
portantly, the government has additional tax revenue in t = 1 through the increase in τa1
(financed by debt in t = 0). This additional distortion-free revenue allows the government
to reduce distortionary labor taxes, which is reflected by the fall in λ to the right of the kink
in Figure 3. Instead of using only distortionary labor taxes, debt and the tax on savings
income can be used to finance (some of) the government’s expenditures.
Of course, these additional revenues come from somewhere. In fact, the government
absorbs and effectively fully “taxes” the additional firm profits that would result from the
wedge. By implementing an equilibrium where Ra1 = fk (opposed to one where it is Ra1 < fk),
firm profits decrease (note that in both cases k1 = ā). Because firm profits are a lump-sum
transfer to the household, the partial taxation of these profits does not influence the house-
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hold’s optimality conditions. From the perspective of the Ramsey planner, the distortion
caused by the borrowing constraint allows for an effective lump-sum tax of firm profits by
increasing τa1 . The emerging distortion by the tightening borrowing constraint leads to an
equilibrium where labor tax distortions are lower.
Eventual increase in s0 and tax distortions. If the borrowing constraint ā falls
sufficiently, it eventually becomes optimal to increase s0. Then the subsidy constraint s0 ≥ 0
is no longer costly to the Ramsey planner and the distortion caused by the subsidy constraint
is no longer active. At this point, the distortion of the borrowing constraint is sufficiently
strong and the private capital is sufficiently low such that it is optimal to prop up capital
k1 by an increase in the subsidy s0.
The fact that it becomes optimal to pay out a subsidy has two effects. First, given that
the subsidy props up capital, the wedge does not open up as much as before, ceteris paribus
(because of a slower increase in the marginal productivity of capital). This gives the govern-
ment less room to effectively tax firm profits—indeed, the savings income tax rate increases
by much less after the kink. Second, by increasing s0 the government needs new financing.
Consequently, labor income tax rates need to increase again. To the left of the kink, the
same tradeoffs take place as when no distortionary taxes are needed in the first place, e.g.
with a high enough government endowment ωg0 (see Figure 2). Then, the new distortion of
the borrowing constraint cannot reduce labor tax distortions, simply because they are not
there in the first place. Thus it is optimal to prop up k1 with subsidies s0 which have to be
financed with larger (than zero) labor income tax rates.
To sum up, this exercise shows that when a new distortion in the form of a borrowing
constraint affects the economy, other existing distortions matter (here, labor tax distor-
tions). It is not optimal to address the borrowing constraint by paying out a subsidy to
relax it. This would worsen the existing labor tax distortion since the subsidy has to be
financed by additional distortionary labor taxes. Only after the borrowing constraint is
sufficiently distortionary, it is optimal to address and relax it somewhat. (It is never opti-
mal to fully relax it as the constraint is always binding.) In fact, the new distortion due to
the borrowing constraint can be exploited, since the government has access to distortion-free
revenue through which it is first optimal to decrease the already existing labor tax distortion.
Remark. In this exercise, the government does not primarily issue more debt because
debt is cheaper (in equilibrium the interest rate Rb1 has fallen with a tightening borrowing
constraint). The government mainly issues debt because there is new tax revenue in the
future in the form of higher savings income taxes. Debt is used as an instrument to shift
taxation from t = 0 to t = 1.
5 Endogenous government expenditures
The result that it is not optimal to relax the new borrowing distortion but rather to exploit it
to reduce another (tax) distortion, translates to richer specifications of the model. I augment
the model along two dimensions. First, government spending gives utility to the household
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and is thus endogenous under the optimal Ramsey policy. Additionally, there is government
investment p1 which enters the production function of the firm. These two additions allow
that the optimal government policy may include higher spending or investment in response
to the borrowing constraint.
Let household preferences be
u(ct, xt, gt) =
c1−σt
1− σ
− ϕ (1− xt)
1+ν
1 + ν
+ ηt log gt.
Further, let the production function be
f(k1, p1, L1) = Ak
α
1 p
γ
1L
ζ
1.
Public investment p1 enhances the productivity of both private capital and labor.14 The
public capital stock is financed by the government in period 0. The government’s budget
constraint are
p1 + g0 + s0 = τ0(1− x0)w0 + b1,
g1 +R
b
1b1 = τ1(1− x1)w1 + τa1Ra1a1.
The full set of equilibrium conditions that characterize the Ramsey allocation are in Ap-
pendix A.2. Compared to before, the question is now not only how to finance a given
amount of government spending, but also how large government spending should be. The
endogeneity of g and p extends the set of instruments of the government. Instead of low-
ering the tax rates, it may, for example, invest in public capital to make up for the fall
in private capital. Or the government may increase government spending g1 to pick up
low private production in t = 1. Figure 4 depicts the optimal policy for parameter values
w0 = 2.5, β = 0.98, A = 3, α = 2/3, ζ = 1/3, γ = 1/3, δ = 1, η = 0.2 and ν = 2.15
By contrast to the special case in 4.1-4.2, labor is productive in period 1 and can thus
be taxed. However, the productivity of labor in period 1 and the inclusion of government
spending and investment do not affect the main mechanism. The behavior of all variables
remains the same. Government spending g0 and public investment p1 track private con-
sumption c0: As a function of a tightening borrowing constraint ā, these variables increase
initially and then fall to the left of the kink.
The same mechanism as discussed before is at work. The distortion of the borrowing
constraint allows for an increase in the savings income tax rate. The additional revenue
allows for a reduction in the labor tax distortion which again leads to higher private con-
sumption in t = 0. Due to decreasing marginal utility, the Ramsey planner distributes
the additional revenue also across the other two margins that give value to the household:
government spending g0 and public investment p1.16 Again, the existing distortion matters
for the optimal policy response. In addition, the main reason why it is optimal to increase
public spending or investment is not to replace private consumption and production. It is
14Note that with a Cobb-Douglas production function, investment in public capital can also be interpreted
as investment in technology A. I have also simulated this exercise with CES production functions, where
f(k1, p1, L1) = A[αkr1 + (1 − α)pr1]1/rL
ζ
1. The qualitative picture remains the same. I also address the case
where public and private investment are perfect substitutes in Appendix C.2.
15Again, choosing different parametrizations does not change the result qualitatively.
16E.g. the Ramsey planner sets uc(0) = ug(0) in equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Endogenous government consumption and investment
primarily because the Ramsey planner implements an allocation where the benefit of lower
labor taxes is distributed across all margins (private and public consumption and public
investment) that give utility to the household.
As the borrowing constraint tightens further, eventually private capital is sufficiently
depressed such that it becomes optimal to prop up k1 with the subsidy s0. This has to be
financed with additional labor tax rates and the course of the other policy variables reverses
with a tightening borrowing constraint ā. The additional policy variables g0 and p1 still
follow c0 and thus decrease to the left of the kink.
6 Concluding remarks
I analyze the optimal government policy in response to a tightening firm borrowing constraint
that may result because of a disturbed transmission channel between savers and borrowers.
The optimal policy response of the government depends on whether other distortions are
present in the economy. Even though the government could address the new distortion in
the economy, I find it is optimal not to. Rather, it is optimal to reduce the existing labor
tax distortion. Only if the borrowing constraint is relatively tight it is optimal to loosen the
constraint by subsidizing the private firm sector.
While the model is stylized and a government has other tools at hand, the model illus-
trates in a simple setting that it is not necessarily prudent to tackle an emerging distortion.
The model also illustrates that given relatively low interest rates, it is not necessarily optimal
for the government to borrow and spend more simply because debt is cheap. Spelling out
the borrowing constraint in more detail and adding more periods would be an interesting
avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the implementability constraints
I derive the implementability constraint for the augmented model with endogenous govern-
ment spending and investment that nests the model where government expenditures are
held fixed. For the competitive equilibrium conditional on some feasible government policy
{τw0 , τw1 , τa1 , τ b1 , s0, g0, g1, p1}, I have 13 variables c0, c1, x0, x1, a1, k1, Rb1, Ra1 , b1, w1, π1, L1, θ
f
0
and 14 equations: four budget constraints, six first-order conditions and a market clearing
condition for labor (1 − x1 = L1), 2 resource constraints and a complementary slackness
condition. Fixing 7 of the 8 policy variables then leads to a system of 14 equations and 14
unknowns.
The budget constraints together with the resource constraints yield the government’s
budget constraints. The Ramsey planner has to respect the following system of equations
that implements a competitive equilibrium:
c0 + b1 + a1 = (1− τw0 )(1− x0)w0,
c1 = (1− τw1 )(1− x1)w1 + (1− τ b1)Rb1b1 + (1− τa1 )Ra1a1 + π1,
uc(0) = βuc(1)R
a
1(1− τa1 ),
(1− τ b1)Rb1 = (1− τa1 )Ra1 ,
ux(t)/uc(t) = (1− τwt )wt, t = 0, 1,
k1 = ω0 + a1 + s0,
π1 = f(k1, p1, L1)−R1a1 − L1w1 + (1− δ)k1,
c0 + g0 + p1 + k1 = (1− x0)w0 + ω0,
c1 + g1 = f(·) + (1− δ)k1,
f1−x1 = w1,
fk + 1− δ = Ra1 + θ
f
0 ,
θf0 (ā− a1) = 0,
L1 = 1− x1.
The FOC for a1 and the complementary slackness condition can be combined to the in-
equality constraint Ra1 ≤ fk + 1 − δ that holds with equality when a1 < ā and may be
slack when a1 = ā. Without loss of generality, I can set τ b1 = 0. L1 is replaced by 1 − x1,
w1 with f1−x1 , and π1 and a1 with the firm budget constraints. Combining the household
budget constraints eliminates b1. Replacing (1− τwt )wt with the labor supply equations, Rb1
and Ra1(1− τa1 ) with the marginal rate of substitution gives rise to the following household
implementability constraint:
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uc(0) + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1) + βuc(1)π1
⇔ uc(0) + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1)+
βuc(1)[f(·)−Ra1(k1 − ω0 + s0) + (1− x1)fL + (1− δ)k1]
⇔ uc(0) + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1)+
βuc(1)[(1− ζ)f(·)− (Ra1 − 1 + δ)k1 +Ra1(ω0 + s0)].
Finally, I replace the interest rate on borrowing Ra1 with the household’s optimality condition
for a1, Ra1 =
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1−τa1 )
:
uc(0) + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1)+
βuc(1)[(1− ζ)f(·) + (1− δ)k1 +
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )
(ω0 + s0 − k1)].
In addition to the constraints that result from the competitive equilibrium conditions, the
Ramsey planner has to respect the borrowing constraint and the subsidy constraint.
Thus the full list of implementability constraints is
uc(0) + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1)+
βuc(1)[(1− ζ)f(·) + (1− δ)k1 +
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )
(ω0 + s0 − k1)],
c0 + g0 + p1 + k1 = (1− x0)w0 + ω0,
c1 + g1 = f(·) + (1− δ)k1,
fk + 1− δ ≥
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )
,
k1 − ω0 + s0 ≤ ā,
s0 ≥ 0.
A.2 Characterization of the Ramsey policy and allocation
Setting up the Lagrangian leads to the following list conditions that describe the Ramsey
allocation. Here I present the list with endogenous government spending and investment,
which nests the specification with a given sequence of government expenditures. The La-
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grangian writes
L = u(c0, x0, g0) + βu(c1, x1, g1)
+ λ[uc(0)c0 + βuc(1)c1 − ux(0)(1− x0)− βux(1)(1− x1)
− βuc(1){(1− α− ζ)f(k1, p1, 1− x1) + (fk + 1− δ)(ω0 + s0)}]
+ µ0[(1− x0)w0 + ω0 + ωg0 − c0 − g0 − k1 − p1]
+ βµ1[f(k1, p1, 1− x1) + (1− δ)k1 − c1 − g1]
+ θ0[ā− k1 + ω0 + s0]
+ θ2[s0 − 0].
The first-order conditions are
c0 : uc(0) + λ[ucc(0)c0 + uc(0)− uxc(0)(1− x0)] = µ0
c1 : uc(1) + λ[ucc(1)c1 + uc(1)− uxc(1)(1− x1)
− ucc(1)((1− α− ζ)f(k1, 1− x1) + (fk + 1− δ)(ω0 + s0))] = µ1
x0 : ux(0) + λ[ux(0)− uxx(1− x0) + ucx(0)c0] = µ0w0
x1 : ux(1) + λ[ux(1)− uxx(1− x1) + ucx(1)c1 − ucx(1){(1− α− ζ)f(·) + (fk + 1− δ)(ω0 + s0)}
− uc(1) ((1− α− ζ)fL1(−1) + fk1L1(ω0 + s0)(−1))] = µ1fL1
g0 : ug(0) + λ[ucg(0)c0 − uxg(0)(1− x0)] = µ0
g1 : ug(1) + λ[ucg(1)c1 − uxg(1)(1− x1)− ucg(1){(1− α− ζ)f(·) + (fk + 1− δ)(ω0 + s0)} = µ1
k1 : −µ0 + βµ1(fk + 1− δ)− λβuc(1)[(1− α− ζ)fk + fkk(ω0 + s0)]− θ0 = 0
p1 : −µ0 + βµ1fkg − λβuc(1)[(1− α− ζ)fkgp + fkkg (ω0 + s0)] = 0
s0 : −λβuc(1)(fk + 1− δ) + θ0 + θ2 = 0.
These first order conditions together with the implementability constraints characterize the
optimal policy and allocation.
B.1 A special case: closed-form solution of the simplifying specifica-
tion when the subsidy constraint is binding
I can find a closed-form solution for the right of the kink. The block of equations that
characterize the equilibrium under the optimal policy is
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c0 : 1/c0 = µ0
c1 : 1/c1 + λ/c
2
1((1− α)f(·) + fks0) = µ1
x0 : ϕ(1 + λ) = µ0w0
k1 : −µ0 + βµ1fk − λβ/c1[(1− α)fk + fkks0]− θ0 = 0
s0 : λβ/c1fk = θ0 + θ2
BC : k1 − s0 ≤ ā (borrowing constraint)
SC : s0 ≥ 0 (subsidy constraint)
IC : 1 + β = ϕ(1− x0) + β/c1[(1− α)f(·) + fks0] (implementability constraint)
RC0 : c0 + k1 + ḡ0 = (1− x0)w0 (resource constraint)
RC1 : c1 = f(·) (resource constraint)
where θ0, θ2 ≥ 0.
When the subsidy constraint is binding (the right side of the kink), it is s0 = 0 and
therefore k1 = ā. From the IC it follows directly 1−x0 = (1+αβ)/ϕ. From the RC0 follows
c0 = (1 + αβ)w0/ϕ− ḡ0 − ā.
Then from the FOC for x0 it is λ = w0/(c0ϕ)− 1. RC1 gives c1 = Aāα. The Euler equation
is given by
1/c0 = β
1
c1
fk(1− λ) + θ2
or
1/c0 = β
1
c1
fk − θ0.
From c1/(βc0) = fk(1 − τa1 ) follows that τa1 = 1 − ā/(αβc0) and θ2 = 1/c0 − (αβ)/ā(2 −
w0/(c0ϕ)). The inflection point (where θ2 = 0) is then:
āl =
αβ(w0 + 2αβw0 − 2ϕg0)
ϕ(1 + 2αβ)
.
To find the point where the borrowing constraint becomes binding, one can use the Euler
equation (23) with θ0 = 0: Then it must be that 1/c0 = αβā or āh = αβ[(1 + αβ)w0/ϕ −
ḡ0 − āh] or āh = αβ1+αβ [(1 + αβ)w0/ϕ− ḡ0].
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B.2 A special case: Derivation of comparative statics results when
the subsidy constraint is not binding
The full list of conditions that describe the Ramsey allocation when the borrowing constraint
is binding is
c0 : 1/c0 = µ0
c1 : 1/c1 + λ/c
2
1((1− α)f(·) + fk(ω0 + s0)) = µ1
x0 : ϕ(1 + λ) = µ0w0
k1 : −µ0 + βµ1fk − λβ/c1[(1− α)fk + fkk(ω0 + s0)]− θ0 = 0
s0 : −λβ/c1(fk + 1− δ) + θ0 = 0
BC : k1 − ω0 − s0 = ā
IC : 1 + β = ϕ(1− x0) + β/c1[(1− α)f(·) + fk(ω0 + s0)]
RC0 : c0 + k1 + ḡ0 = (1− x0)w0 + ω0
RC1 : c1 = f(·)
9 equations, 9 unknowns.
Using the FOC for s0 in the one for k1 (replacing θ0), I have
−µ0 + βµ1fk − λβ/c1fk(1− (α− 1)ā/k1) = 0.
Combining with the FOCs for c0 and c1 gives
−1/c0 + βfk/c1 − λβ/c1fkā/k1 = 0
and can be rewritten as
1/c0 = β/c1fk(1− λā/k1)
where τa1 = λā/k1. It follows, with distortionary taxes (λ 6= 0), savings income taxes are
positive (it is always λ ≥ 0. Only when ā = 0 it is τa1 = 0).
Proof of Proposition 3. When the borrowing constraint is binding, all real variables
are lower than in the first-best allocation. Government debt and the tax rates are higher.
When the borrowing constraint is not binding, λ = 0 and the first-best allocation results
(see Proposition 1). When it is binding, λ > 0. In the following, I show that the value of
the variables are lower (higher for debt and the tax rates) when λ > 0 compared to when
λ = 0.
The Euler equations for private capital reads 1/c0 = β/c1fk(1 − λā/k1) which implies
τa1 = λā/k1. When the borrowing constraint is binding, λ > 0 (otherwise λ = 0). From
the FOC for x0 we have c0 = w0ϕ(1+λ) : Consumption c0 is lower the more costly the imple-
mentability constraint is (the higher λ).
Combining the Euler equation with the resource constraint for period 1 gives k1 =
αc0(1 − λā/k1). With λ > 0 the RHS is necessarily smaller than when λ = 0. It follows
that the capital stock and thus production in period 1 is lower compared to the first-best
case. The resource constraint c0 + k1 + ḡ0 = (1 − x0)w0 then implies that labor supply is
also lower.
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The labor tax rate is higher (greater than zero): (1 − τw0 )w0 = c0ϕ. The savings tax
rate τa1 = λā/k1 is now positive (it is zero in the first-best). The same is true for debt:
b1 = τ
a
1 āR
a
1/R
b
1. Finally, the transfer s0 = τw0 (1 − x0)w0 + b1 − ḡ0 is higher: Tax revenue
from labor income taxes and savings income taxes (via b1) has increased (from zero) and
the expenditures on public capital are lower. 
C.1 Other taxes
I investigate how robust my results are when I consider other linear taxes. Some taxes are
redundant, others are not, but the picture does not change qualitatively. A special case is
an excise tax on firm borrowing paid by the firm.
Profit Taxes. Say the household pays a fraction τπ1 of the profits received to the gov-
ernment. Without any upper bound on τπ1 , it would be optimal to set τπ1 = 1 as this tax is
not distortionary. Given an upper bound on the tax rate τπ1 , the optimal policy is to set the
tax rate as high as possible (to the upper bound). The comparative statics of a tightening
borrowing constraint lead to the same result qualitatively.
Consumption Excise Tax. Say the household pays (1 + τ ct ) to consume one unit of
consumption in t. The household implementability constraint is then
uc(0)c0 + βuc(1)c1 = ux(0)(1− x0) + βux(1)(1− x1) +
βuc(1)
1 + τ c1
π1.
The firm demand optimality condition is
fk + 1− δ ≥
uc(0)
βuc(1)
1 + τ c1
1 + τ c0
1
1− τa1
= Ra1 .
With the tax on savings τa1 available, this inequality will again be binding in equilibrium, and
the term Ra1 can be replaced by fk +1− δ in the profit function. Whereas τ c0 disappears and
is thus redundant (the Ramsey plan determines the intratemporal wedge (1−τw0 )/(1+τ c0 ) =
ux(0)/[uc(0)w0]), the tax rate τ c1 does not disappear if there are firm profits.
The tax rate τ c1 can take over the role of τa1 . By increasing τa1 the interest rate Ra1
increases under the optimal policy and closes the wedge. An increase in τ c1 achieves the
same result. Conducting the comparative statics exercise and setting τa1 = 0 leads to the
same result. With a higher tax on consumption in period 1, the tax on labor falls, in order
that the intratemporal wedge remains the same, i.e. the fraction (1− τw1 )/(1 + τ c1 ). To sum
up, a consumption tax does lead to a slightly different allocation, because it impacts the
valuation of firm profits, however, the qualitative picture and the kink remain the same.
Tax on firm return to capital. Say the firm maximizes profits π = f(·)−(1+τk1 )Ra1−
w1L1 + (1− δ)k1. Its first order condition then is
fk + 1− δ = (1 + τk1 )Ra1 + θ
f
0 .
When a wedge opens up, θf0 > 0, the government can close it by increasing the tax rate τ
k
1 .
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This tax rate enters the implementability constraints only through the firm optimality
conditions. In fact, the condition reads
fk + 1− δ ≥ (1 + τk1 )Ra1 = (1 + τk1 )
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )
.
The Ramsey planner can close the wedge by making borrowing more expensive. For the
household, everything else equal, nothing changes.
Similar to τ c1 before, τk1 takes over the role of τa1 . Setting τa1 = 0 leads to the exact same
Ramsey allocation. These tax instruments all affect the intertemporal margin and can be
used to equate the cost of borrowing for the firm to the marginal product on capital and
thus closing the wedge.
Excise tax on firm borrowing. Say the firm’s budget constraint in period 0 is
k1 = ω0 + (1 + τ
z
0 )a1 + s0.
The government can proportionally give a subsidy per unit borrowing. The firm’s borrowing
constraint is then
a1 = (1 + τ
z
0 )
−1(k1 − ω0 − s0) ≤ ā
or
k1 − ω0 − s0 ≤ (1 + τz0 )ā.
The government can also mitigate the borrowing constraint by paying out a subsidy τz0 ā.
The firm’s optimality condition is fk+1−δ = Ra1/(1+ τz0 )+θ
f
0 or (fk+1−δ)(1+ τz0 ) ≥ Ra1 .
ReplacingRa1 with the household optimality condition for a1, the implementability constraint
is uc(0) ≤ βuc(1)(fk + 1 − δ)(1 − τa1 )(1 + τz0 ). The Ramsey planner can simply undo the
borrowing constraint by increasing τz0 . He finances this increase with debt and pays it back
by increasing τa1 . The interest rate Ra1 increases. However, this is fine, as the firm wants to
equate the interest rate with fk(1 + τz0 ). If I constrain τz0 from above, eventually this is not
possible and the usual optimal adjustment process will take place with the resulting kink.
The household’s savings remain the same, initially. She simply exchanges lending to
the firm with saving in government bonds. The government uses these proceeds to finance
τz0 a1 and pays it back with additional τa1Ra1a1. The combination of τz0 and τa1 is such that
(1 + τz0 )(1− τa1 ) = 1.
If the inequality constraint is binding, I can again replace the firm optimality condition
into the profit function. As long as τz0 is unconstrained, the Ramsey planner can undo the
borrowing constraint and implement the same allocation.
Implementability constraints: The only implementability constraints that change are the
household intertemporal budget constraint, the firm optimality condition, and the borrowing
constraint. That is
+λ
(
. . .− βuc(1)[(1− ζ)f(·)−
uc(0)
βuc(1)(1− τa1 )(1 + τz0 )
[k1 − ω0 − s0] + (1− δ)k1
)
+θ0[ā− (1 + τz0 )−1(k1 − ω0 − s0)]
+θ1[βuc(1)(fk + 1− δ)(1− τa1 )(1 + τz0 )− uc(0)]
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Assuming an interior solution, the FOC for τa1 again ensures that the constraint associ-
ated with θ1 is binding. This means that the term uc(0)/[βuc(1)(fk + 1− δ)(1− τa1 )(1 + τz0 )]
can be replaced by fk + 1 − δ. The tax τa1 then disappears in the set of implementabil-
ity constraints, but τz0 remains. Then, without restriction on τz0 the problem then is not
bounded: The FOC for τz0 would read āθ0 = 0. Unless ā = 0 it must be that θ0 = 0 and
the constraint is not relevant to the Ramsey planner. When the tax rate is bounded, say
τz0 ≤ κ, the borrowing constraint is binding when the tax rate hits that ceiling. When the
tax instrument τz0 can freely be adjusted, the Ramsey planner can fully undo the borrowing
constraint. Once this ceiling is hit, the normal adjustment process takes place, where ini-
tially it is optimal not to increase s0 but it is optimal to decrease labor taxes.
Lump-sum household tax. With a lump-sum tax t0 on the household’s side the
problem becomes trivial. The first order condition for t0 is
λuc(0) = 0.
Assuming an interior solution, we have λ = 0 and the household implementability constraint
is not costly to the Ramsey planner. By Proposition 1, both the subsidy constraint and the
borrowing constraint cannot be costly and the first-best allocation results, even when the
borrowing constraint tightens and ā falls. The Ramsey planner can implement the first-best
allocation in the following way: The Ramsey planner can increase lump-sum taxes on the
household, who accordingly saves less in a1 one to one. The higher lump-sum tax finances
a subsidy to the firm. For the household, the loss in savings income is fully compensated
by higher profit transfers have fewer savings income, but higher profit transfers make up for
the lump-sum tax.
Tax collection cost in the subsidy. I assume the tax collection cost is paid for by
the firm, in the sense that a part of the subsidy is wasted.
k1 = ω0 + a1 + s0 − χ
s20
2
,
where χ > 0. When s0 > 0, the private capital stock increases less than one to one with the
subsidy payment. The qualitative properties remain the same. Initially, it is not optimal
to increase the subsidy s0. After the kink, when private capital is sufficiently depressed,
the subsidy payment increases less quickly compared to the baseline specification, because
raising the subsidy leads to resource losses in the form of payment or collection costs. Intro-
ducing a distortion in the collection or payment of the subsidy does not change the picture
qualitatively.
C.2 Alternative production function: perfect substitutes
Say the capital stocks k1 and p1 are perfect substitutes, i.e. f(k1, p1, L1) = A(k1 + p1)αL
ζ
1.
A tightening of the borrowing constraint leads to the same qualitative picture as above.
Initially it is not optimal to increase the subsidy s0, but rather to decrease the labor income
tax rate by issuing new debt (see Figure 5). Since k1 and p1 are perfect substitutes, it is also
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Figure 5: Public and private capital are perfect substitutes, ḡ0 = 0.3
optimal not to increase p1. Once it becomes optimal to increase the subsidy, the composition
of k1 and p1 is irrelevant. Leaving s0 = 0 and k1 = ā, and instead increasing p1 would result
in the same allocation.
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